## Advanced Microeconomics I

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Problem Set 4: Suggested Solutions

1. Show that  $c(F, u_2) \leq c(F, u_1)$  for all distributions F if and only if there exists an increasing concave function  $\psi(\cdot)$  such that  $u_2(x) = \psi(u_1(x))$ . (Hint: use Jensen's inequality).

**Solution:** Any concave function  $g(\cdot)$  satisfies Jensen's inequality:

$$\int g(x) \, dF(x) \le g\left(\int x \, dF(x)\right).$$

For any distribution F, we have

$$u_{2}(c(F, u_{2})) = \int u_{2}(x) dF \quad \text{by the definition of certainty equivalent} \\ = \int \phi(u_{1}(x)) dF \\ \leq \phi\left(\int u_{1}(x) dF\right) \quad \text{by Jensen's inequality} \\ = \phi\left(u_{1}(c(F, u_{1}))\right) \quad \text{by the definition of certainty equivalent} \\ = u_{2}(c(F, u_{1})).$$

Since  $u_2(c(F, u_2)) \leq u_2(c(F, u_1))$  and  $u_2(\cdot)$  is increasing, we have  $c(F, u_2) \leq c(F, u_1)$  as desired.

- 2. A strictly risk-averse decision maker has initial wealth W and faces possible loss of D < W. The probability that the loss will occur is  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Suppose insurance is available at price q < 1 per unit, where q is not necessarily the fair price.
  - (a) For what values of q will the decision maker want to buy strictly positive amount of insurance?

**Solution:** The DM's expected utility is

$$U(x) = \frac{1}{2}u(W - qx) + \frac{1}{2}u(W - D - qx + x)$$
  
=  $\frac{1}{2}u(W - qx) + \frac{1}{2}u(W - D + (1 - q)x).$   
 $\Rightarrow MU(x) = \frac{1}{2}u'(W - qx)(-q) + \frac{1}{2}u'(W - D + (1 - q)x)(1 - q).$ 

For  $x^* > 0$ , we need require MU(0) > 0:

$$\frac{1}{2}u'(W)(-q) + \frac{1}{2}u'(W-D)(1-q) > 0$$
  
$$\Rightarrow q < \frac{u'(W-D)}{u'(W) + u'(W-D)}.$$

(b) Suppose the decision maker exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Assuming that the optimal insurance purchase  $x^*$  is an interior solution (that is,  $x^* \in (0, D)$ ) determine whether  $x^*$  is increasing or decreasing as the initial wealth, W, increases.

Solution: FOC for interior solution is given by

$$\frac{1}{2}u'(W - qx^*)(-q) + \frac{1}{2}u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^*)(1 - q) = 0.$$

Differentiating this w.r.t. W yields

$$u''(W - qx^*)(-q) + u''(W - qx^*)(-q)^2 \frac{dx^*}{dW} + u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^*)(1 - q) + u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^*)(1 - q)^2 \frac{dx^*}{dW} = 0$$
  
$$\implies \frac{dx^*}{dW} = \frac{-u''(W - qx^*)(-q) - u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^*)(1 - q)}{u''(W - qx^*)(-q)^2 + u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^*)(1 - q)^2}.$$

Note that  $x^* < D$  and DARA means

$$W - D + (1 - q)x^* = W - qx^* + (x^* - D) < W - qx^* \implies R_a(W - D + (1 - q)x^*) > R_a(W - qx^*).$$

Therefore, the numerator is:

$$-u''(W - qx^{*})(-q) - u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})(1 - q)$$

$$= -\frac{u''(W - qx^{*})}{u'(W - qx^{*})}u'(W - qx^{*})(-q) - \frac{u''(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})}{u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})}u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})(1 - q)$$

$$= R_{a}(W - qx^{*})u'(W - qx^{*})(-q) + R_{a}(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})(1 - q)$$

$$> R_{a}(W - qx^{*})u'(W - qx^{*})(-q) + R_{a}(W - qx^{*})u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})(1 - q)$$

$$= R_{a}(W - qx^{*})\underbrace{\left(u'(W - qx^{*})(-q) + u'(W - D + (1 - q)x^{*})(1 - q)\right)}_{=0 \text{ by FOC}} = 0.$$

Thus, we have  $\frac{dx^*}{dW} = \frac{(+)}{(-)} < 0.$ 

3. Consider an investor whose utility function over money is

$$u(w) = 2w^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

The investor can invest in a riskless asset that returns 1 (gross return per \$1 invested) for sure, or a risky asset that returns 1.4 with probability  $\frac{3}{4}$  and 0.8 with probability  $\frac{1}{4}$ .

(a) Suppose the investor's initial wealth is \$1000. Letting x denote the amount invested in the risky asset, write the investor's expected utility as a function of x.

Solution: We have

$$g(x) = \begin{cases} 1000 - x + 1.4x = 1000 + 0.4x & \text{with probability } \frac{3}{4} \\ 1000 - x + 0.8x = 1000 - 0.2x & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{4} \end{cases}$$

So,

$$U(g(x)) = \frac{3}{4}u(1000 + 0.4x) + \frac{1}{4}u(1000 - 0.2x)$$
  
=  $\frac{3}{4}\left(2(1000 + 0.4x)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right) + \frac{1}{4}\left(2(1000 - 0.2x)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)$ 

(b) Find the optimal amount to invest in the risky asset. Solution: Investor solves:

$$\max_{x} \frac{3}{4} \left( 2(1000+0.4x)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right) + \frac{1}{4} \left( 2(1000-0.2x)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right)$$

FOC is given by

$$\left(\frac{3}{4}\right)\left(\frac{4}{10}\right)(1000+0.4x)^{-\frac{1}{2}} - \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)\left(\frac{2}{10}\right)(1000-0.2x)^{-\frac{1}{2}} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{3}{10}\right) (1000 + 0.4x)^{-\frac{1}{2}} = \left(\frac{1}{20}\right) (1000 - 0.2x)^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$
$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{10}{3}\right)^2 (1000 + 0.4x) = (20)^2 (1000 - 0.2x)$$
$$\Rightarrow x = \frac{(400)(1000) - \left(\frac{100}{9}\right) (1000)}{\left(\frac{100}{9}\right) (0.4) + (400)(0.2)} \approx 4605.263.$$

Note that  $x^* = 4605.263$  is greater than the initial wealth. So, if so-called "short sale" is possible, the investor will borrow additional \$3,605.263 to invest in the risky asset. If borrowing is not possible, then the investor will put the maximum amount in the risky asset. That is,  $x^* = 1000$ .

4. An investor with initial wealth  $w_0$  is trying to allocate her wealth between a safe asset with constant return R > 0 and a risky asset with random return z, where z has distribution function F and E[z] > R. Letting x be the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset  $(0 \le x \le 1)$ , her wealth will be:

$$w = ((1-x)R + xz)w_0 = (R + x(z - R))w_0,$$

where z is the realized return. Suppose the investor's utility over wealth,  $u(\cdot)$ , exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Show that the optimal proportion of

wealth invested in the risky asset is independent of her initial wealth. That is, show that  $\frac{dx^*}{dw_0} = 0$ .

Solution: The investor's expected utility maximization is

$$\max_{x} \operatorname{E}[u(w(x))] \iff \max_{x} \int u((R+x(z-R))w_0) dF(z).$$

The first order condition is

$$\int u' \big( \big(R + x^*(z - R)\big) w \big) (z - R) w \, dF(z) = 0$$
  
$$\iff \int u' \big( \big(R + x^*(z - R)\big) w \big) (z - R) \, dF(z) = 0 \quad (*)$$

Differentiating the FOC (\*) with respect to w yields (note that we use chain rule on  $x^*$ )

$$\int u'' ((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)^2 w \frac{dx^*}{dw} dF(z) + \int u'' ((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)(R + x^*(z - R)) dF(z) = 0$$
  
$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{dx^*}{dw} = \frac{-\int u'' ((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)(R + x^*(z - R)) dF(z)}{\int u'' ((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)^2 w dF(z)}$$

Looking at the numerator, we see that

$$\int u'' ((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)(R + x^*(z - R)) dF(z)$$

$$= \int \frac{wu''((R + x^*(z - R))w)(R + x^*(z - R))}{u'((R + x^*(z - R))w)} \left(\frac{u'((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R)}{w}\right) dF(z)$$

$$= \frac{\text{constant}}{w} \int u'((R + x^*(z - R))w)(z - R) dF(z) \quad \text{by CRRA}$$

$$= 0 \quad \text{by (*).}$$

So,  $\frac{dx^*}{dw} = 0$ , as required.

5. Let *L* be the lottery  $(\frac{1}{2} \circ 20, \frac{1}{2} \circ 10)$ , and let *L'* be the lottery obtained from *L* in the following way. If the outcome 20 is realized under *L*, then nothing further happens. However, if the outcome 10 is realized, then another lottery  $L'' = (\frac{1}{4} \circ 10, \frac{3}{4} \circ x)$  is drawn and the final outcome is the outcome from *L* plus the outcome from *L''*, as illustrated below.



(a) Find the values of x, if any, for which L' first order stochastically dominate L.

**Solution:** For L' to first order stochastically dominate L, we need  $F_{L'} \leq F_L$ . Since L' only takes values 10 + x or 20, it means that x > 0.

(b) Find the values of x, if any, for which L first order stochastically dominate L'.

**Solution:** For L to first order stochastically dominate L', we need  $F_L(10) \leq F_{L'}(10)$ . Since L' only takes values 10 + x or 20, it means that  $x \leq 0$ . However, then

$$F_L(15) = \frac{1}{2} \nleq \frac{3}{8} = P(L' = 15).$$

So L cannot FOSD L' for any value of x.

(c) Find the values of x, if any, for which L second order stochastically dominate L'.

Solution: We need

$$E[L''] = \frac{10}{4} + \frac{3x}{4} \le 0 \implies x \le \frac{-10}{3}.$$